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1Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Firm Leverage
Abstract
This paper investigates the link between the optimal level of non¯nancial ¯rms'
leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. We develop a structural model of a
¯rm's value maximization problem that predicts that as macroeconomic uncer-
tainty increases the ¯rm will decrease its optimal level of borrowing. We test this
proposition using a panel of non{¯nancial US ¯rms drawn from the COMPUSTAT
quarterly database covering the period 1993{2003. The estimates con¯rm that as
macroeconomic uncertainty increases, ¯rms decrease their levels of leverage. Fur-
thermore, similar ¯rms react di®erently to di®erent macroeconomic uncertainty
proxies. We demonstrate that our results are robust with respect to the inclusion
of the index of leading indicators.
Keywords: leverage, uncertainty, non{¯nancial ¯rms, panel data.
JEL classi¯cation: C23, D8, D92, G32.
21 Introduction
\WASHINGTON, March 12 (Reuters) | Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (NYSE:NWL
| News), a household and business products maker, on Wednesday ¯led with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (News { Websites) to periodically
sell up to $1 billion in debt securities ... company said the net proceeds of
the sale would be used for general corporate purposes. These could include
additions to working capital, repayment of existing debt and acquisitions,
according to the shelf registration ¯ling. Under such a ¯ling, a company
may sell securities from time to time in one or more o®erings, with amounts,
prices and terms determined at the time of sale."1
As all these changes in debt a®ect the leverage level, it is important to understand
the driving factors leading to this variation. For this purpose one has to study the
indicators that in°uence the underwriters' advice with respect to the best timing for
issuing debt. The motivation for this research is further illustrated by the amount of
debt issuance taking place. For example on March 12, 2003 Reuters announced twelve
other debt issues, including Moore North America ($400 mln), Citigroup ($1.5 bln),
Bank of America ($295 mln), Shaw Group ($253 mln), Comcast ($1.5 bln), Eli Lilly
($500 mln), Hanson Australia Funding ($600 mln), and Unisys Corp ($300 mln).2
The most common purposes for borrowing are capital investment and existing debt
repayment. However, some corporations change the amount of debt they issue just
before the o±cial announcement. For instance, both Citigroup and Comcast originally
planned to sell $1.0 billion notes each. In this paper we intend to shed some light on
the issue why ¯rms change their decisions about initial o®erings. A ¯rm might apply
for external ¯nancing because of ¯rm{speci¯c problems, but it could be a case when it
is just a good time to get funds.
The determinants of capital structure have always attracted considerable attention in
the literature. In their seminal work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) derived the theoretical
result that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, ¯nancial and real variables
are irrelevant for a ¯rm's capital structure. However, recent empirical research provides
1Citation: Yahoo! Bond Center: Latest Bond Market News, 12 March 2003,
http://biz.yahoo.com/n/z/z0400.html?htime=1047576818
2Ibid.
3contrary evidence. For instance, a vast number of studies show a positive relationship
between liquid asset holdings and ¯rms' investment decisions.3 Other studies show that
¯rm leverage depends on ¯rm{speci¯c characteristics such as cash holdings, total assets,
and the investment{to{capital ratio.4 However, empirical evidence on the interaction of
macroeconomic level variables and levels of capital structure indicators is rather scarce.
@e intend to contribute to the literature on corporate structure by analyzing the impact
of macroeconomic uncertainty on the optimal level of leverage.
We formulate a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model of a representative
¯rm's value optimization problem. The model is based upon an empirically testable hy-
pothesis regarding the association between the optimal level of debt and macroeconomic
uncertainty. The model predicts that an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty leads
to a decrease in leverage. In times of greater macroeconomic uncertainty companies will
issue less debt.
For testing this prediction we utilize an unbalanced panel of non{¯nancial ¯rms'
data obtained from the quarterly COMPUSTAT database over the 1993{2003 period.
After some screening procedures it includes more than 30,000 manufacturing ¯rm{year
observations, with about 700 ¯rms per quarter. We also consider a sample split, de¯n-
ing categories of durable{goods makers vs. non{durable goods makers. We apply the
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data approach.
Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. We ¯nd evidence of a negative
association between the optimal level of debt and macroeconomic uncertainty as proxied
by either the conditional variance of industrial production, CPI in°ation, S&P 500 index
and index of leading indicators. Moreover, results di®er across di®erent groups of the
¯rms. The results turn out to be robust to the inclusion of the index of leading indicators.
These results provide useful insights into corporate capital structure decisions. Changes
in macroeconomic uncertainty, partially in°uenced by monetary policy, will not only af-
fect ¯rms' leverage but also their costs of obtaining external ¯nance, and in turn their
investment dynamics. Moreover, monetary policy will have an e®ect on the discount
rates of investment projects. Therefore, our results suggest that the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy is much more complicated than formulated in standard models
which ignore the interaction of real and ¯nancial variables' ¯rst and second moments.
3See for example Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998); Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
4See Johnson (1997); Biais and Casamatta (1999); Weill (2001).
4The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple value
maximization model for a representative ¯rm. Section 3 describes the data and discusses
our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
2 The Q Model of Firm Value Optimization
2.1 Model Setup
The theoretical model proposed in this paper is based on the ¯rm value optimization
problem and represents a generalization of the standard Q models of investment by
Whited (1992) and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992). The present value of the ¯rm is
equated to the expected discounted stream of Dt, dividends paid to shareholders, where











Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It; (2)
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5BT = 0;8t (5)
The ¯rm maximizes equation (1) subject to three constraints. The ¯rst is the capital
stock accounting identity Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It; where Kt is the beginning{of{period
capital stock, It is investment expenditures, and ± is the rate of capital depreciation. The
second constraint de¯nes ¯rm dividends, where ¦(Kt) denotes the maximized value of
current pro¯ts taking as given the beginning{of{period capital stock. C(It;Kt;"t) is the
real cost of adjusting It units of capital, which is a®ected by idiosyncratic uncertainty
measure "t.
The price of external ¯nancing is equal to base gross interest rate, R(¿t+1), multiplied
by an external premium, ´(Bt+1;Kt+1) which depends on ¯rm{speci¯c characteristics
such as debt, capital stock. Note, that the base interest rate is assumed to be a pos-
itive monotonic function of macroeconomic uncertainty, ¿t+1. Similar to Gilchrist and
5Himmelberg (1998), we also assume ´B;t > 0: i.e., highly indebted ¯rms must pay an ad-
ditional premium to compensate debt{holders for additional costs because of monitoring
or hazard problems. Moreover, ´K;t < 0: i.e., large ¯rms enjoy a lower risk premium.
Finally, Bt denotes ¯nancial liabilities of the ¯rm.
At time t, all present values and Bt+1 are known with certainty while all future
variables are stochastic. In order to isolate the role of debt ¯nancing we assume that
equity ¯nancing is too expensive and ¯rms prefer debt ¯nancing only. Furthermore,
managers are assumed to have rational expectations.
Financial frictions are also introduced through the non{negativity constraint for div-
idends, Dt ¸ 0 and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier ¸t: The ¸t can be interpreted
as the shadow cost of internally generated funds. Equation (5) is the transversality con-
dition which prevents the ¯rm from borrowing an in¯nite amount and paying it out as
dividends.
Solving the optimization problem we derive the following Euler equation for invest-
ment:
CI;t + 1 = Et [¯£t (¦K;t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)(CI;t+1 + 1) ¡ Rt+1´K;t+1Bt+1)] (6)
Note that £t =
(1+¸t+1)
(1+¸t) . Expression ¯£t may serve as a stochastic time-varying discount
factor which is equal to ¯ in the absence of ¯nancial constraints (¸t+1 = ¸t).5
From the ¯rst-order conditions for debt we derive:
Et [¯£tRt+1 (´t+1 + ´B;t+1Bt+1)] = 1: (7)
In the steady state ¯Etf(Rt+1)£tg = ¯EfRt+1g = 1; which implies that ´t+1+´B;t+1Bt+1 =
0: Since we assume ´B;t+1 > 0; Bt is guaranteed to be positive only if ´t+1 < 0: Gilchrist
and Himmelberg (1998) suggest that the risk premium may be negative if ´t+1 is con-
sidered as net of tax advantages or agency bene¯ts.
Combining the ¯rst order conditions and ignoring covariances terms we receive the
optimal level for borrowing
Bt+1 =
Etf¦K;t+1£tg + (1 ¡ ±)Etf£tCI;t+1g ¡ Etf£t´t+1gEtfR(¿t+1)g ¡ 1=¯CI;t
´BEtf£tgEtfR(¿t+1)g + ´KEfR(¿t+1)g
(8)
5For simplicity, we ignore the derivative of the investment adjustment cost function with respect to
the capital stock, CK;t. In our data the mean of It






. Therefore, its e®ect is negligible.









Compared to frictionless economy, the ¯rm facing higher costs of external ¯nancing,
caused by increase in macroeconomic volatility, decreases its borrowing.
2.2 Econometric Speci¯cation
We test the hypothesis that macroeconomic uncertainty a®ects ¯rms' debt decisions
based directly on the Euler equation (6). It relates the optimal level of debt, Bt+1; with
the marginal pro¯t of capital, ¦K;t+1, the marginal adjustment cost of investment, CI;t,
the expected marginal adjustment cost, EtfCI;t+1g, the relative shadow cost of external
¯nancing, £t, and expected base interest rate which is a function of macroeconomic
uncertainty, R(¿t+1).
To obtain the Euler equation for estimation it is necessary to parameterize the ad-
justment cost function, CI;t. As in Chirinko (1987) and Hayashi (1982), we utilize an
adjustment cost function given by C(It;Kt) = ®=2(It=Kt ¡ ºi)
2 Kt. The parameter
ºi might be interpreted as a ¯rm-speci¯c optimal level of investment. The marginal







where TAit is total assets of ¯rm i at time t.
In order to introduce idiosyncratic uncertainty into the model, we parameterize ex-
pected marginal adjustment cost as the realized (I=K)i;t+1 plus idiosyncratic uncer-




























It+1; where "t+1 is a idiosyncratic shock indepen-
dent of
It+1










= Át+1: Then the expected
marginal adjustment cost of a ¯rm i at time t is:


















where S is the ¯rm's sales, TA is the total assets, µ =
®k
¹ , ®k is the capital share in
the Cobb{Douglas production function speci¯cation and ¹ is the markup (de¯ned as
1/(1+·¡1), where · is the ¯rm{level price elasticity of demand).
In order to implement Euler equation estimation we linearize the product of ¯t;
£t and At; where At = ¦K;t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)(CI;t+1 + 1) ¡ R(¿t+1)´K;t+1Bt+1: We utilize
a ¯rst{order Taylor approximation around the means. Ignoring constant terms, the
approximation is equal to:7
¯t£tAt = ¯°£t + ¯At + °¯t
where ¯ is the average discount factor and ° denotes the unconditional mean of At.
The level of ¯nancing constraint for a representative ¯rm i at time t, £it, is a function
of their stock of cash and level of debt:








Kit is the cash{to{total assets ratio,
Bit
Kit is the debt level and a0i is a ¯rm{speci¯c
indicator of ¯nancial constraints. Debt generates interest and principal obligations and
increases the probability of ¯nancial distress, while the availability of liquid assets de-
creases the external ¯nance constraint (see also Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995);
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004); Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998)).
Finally, the basic interest rate R(¿t + 1) is assumed to be a linear function of macro-
economic uncertainty and index of leading indicator, which represents the overall eco-
nomic health.
R(¿t) = »1¿t + »2Leadingt (13)
The resulting empirical speci¯cation is:8
Bit
TAit
















6The discussion in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) suggests that a sales{based measure of the
marginal pro¯t of capital is more desirable comparing to operating income measure.
7See also Love (2003)
8Debt is scaled by total assets in order to decrease the e®ect of heteroscedasticity, and changed time
indices for B=TAt+1, which is determined at time t.
8+ ¯6¿t¡1 + ¯7Át + ¯8Leadinct¡1 + fi + Indi + eit
Since COMPUSTAT gives end{of{period values for ¯rms, we include lagged proxies
for uncertainty and macroeconomic \health" in the regressions rather than contempo-
raneous proxies. Thus, we can say that recently{experienced volatility will a®ect ¯rms'
behavior. Moreover, we control for industry speci¯c e®ects using industry dummies Indi.
The main hypothesis of our paper can be stated as:
H0 : ¯6 < 0 (15)
That is, macroeconomic uncertainty a®ects optimal level of leverage and this e®ect
is negative. In other words, when ¯rms anticipate \bad times" then they carry a lower
level of debt. Our model speci¯cation also predicts that ¯3 < 0 and ¯4 < 0. The
optimal level of ¯rm leverage increases in response to a decrease in liquid assets or sales.
Moreover, given the existence of multi{period liabilities, we expect to ¯nd persistence
in the leverage ratio, ¯1 > 0.
The main aim of our study is to investigate whether robust results are obtained using
di®erent uncertainty measures, not to identify every structural model coe±cient.9
2.3 Identifying Uncertainty
The macroeconomic uncertainty identi¯cation approach resembles that of Baum, Caglayan,
Ozkan and Talavera (2002). Firms' debt decisions depend on anticipation of future prof-
its and investments. The di±culty of evaluating the optimal amount of debt issuing
increases with the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The literature suggests candidates for macroeconomic uncertainty proxies such as a
moving standard deviation (see Ghosal and Loungani (2000)), standard deviation across
12 forecasting terms of output growth and in°ation rate in the next 12 month (see
Driver and Moreton (1991)). However, as in Driver, Temple and Urga (2005) and Byrne
and Davis (2002) we use a GARCH model for measuring macroeconomic uncertainty.
We argue that this approach is better suited in our case because disagreement among
forecasters may not a valid uncertainty measure and it may contain measurement errors.
9It is possible to show that all ¯'s are functions of model parameters, but it is not possible to identify
every parameter without making non{justi¯able assumptions.
9To ensure that our empirical ¯ndings are not an artifact of a single choice of proxy,
we construct four proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty from the conditional variances
of index of leading indicators, the index of industrial production, the rate of consumer
price in°ation and returns on the S&P 500 stockmarket index. Each of these measures
captures di®erent elements of the uncertainty perceived by ¯rms' managers relating to
the macroeconomic environment; the mean bivariate correlation among the four mea-
sures is 0.51. Qualitatively similar ¯ndings across each of these proxies lend strength to
tests of our hypothesis.
The ¯rst proxy employed is the conditional variance of index of leading indicators
(DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics series DLEAD) as a measure of overall macro-
economic activity. The second proxy is derived from the monthly index of industrial
production itself (International Financial Statistics series 66IZF). This is a narrower
measure, focusing on industrial activity and omitting the service{sector activity which
has become increasingly important to the US economy. The third proxy, designed to
pick up uncertainty related to nominal magnitudes, is derived from the monthly rate
of consumer price in°ation (International Financial Statistics series 64XZF). The last
proxy, focused on ¯nancial market uncertainty, is derived from the monthly returns on
Standard and Poor's 500 share index (from CRSP Stockmarket Indices).
The conditional variances of each of these variables is estimated with a generalized
ARCH (GARCH) model, where the mean equation is a ¯rst{order autoregression, al-
lowing for ARMA errors.10 The speci¯cs of the GARCH models are provided in Table
1.11 Each GARCH model's estimated conditional variance series, ¿t, is then employed
in a revised version of equation (14).
There are di®erent measures of ¯rm{speci¯c risk employed in the literature. Bo
and Lensink (2005) use three measures: stock price volatility, estimated as di®erence
between the highest and the lowest stock price normalized by the lowest price; volatility
of sales measured by a seven{year window coe±cient of variation of sales; and volatility
of number of employees estimated similar to volatility of sales. A slightly di®erent
10Alternatively, some researchers suggest using a moving standard deviation of the macroeconomic
series while others propose using survey{based measures based on the dispersion of forecasts. The
former approach su®ers from substantial serial correlation problems in the constructed series while the
latter potentially contains sizable measurement errors.
11Unsurprisingly, the initial model for stock returns did not contain a statistically signi¯cant autore-
gressive term, so it was reestimated without a lagged dependent variable.
10approach is used in Bo (2002). First, he sets up the forecasting AR(1) equation for
the underlying uncertainty variable. Second, the unpredictable part of the °uctuations,
the estimated residuals, are obtained. Third, the estimated three{year moving average
standard deviation is obtained. As underlying variables the author uses sales and interest
rates.
In contrast to the mentioned ¯rm uncertainty measures, we employ the standard
deviation of close price for the stock of ¯rm during last nine months.12 This measure is
calculated using COMPUSTAT items data12, 1st month of quarter close price; data13,
2nd month of quarter close price; data14, 3rd month of quarter close price; and their
¯rst and second lags. We suggest that volatility of stock prices re°ect not only sales or
costs uncertainty, but also captures other idiosyncratic risks.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Dataset
We work with the COMPUSTAT Industrial Quarterly database of U.S. ¯rms. The initial
databases include 201,552 ¯rms' quarterly characteristics over 1993{2000. The ¯rms are
classi¯ed by two{digit Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (SIC). The main advantage of
the dataset is that it contains detailed balance sheet information. However, one potential
shortcoming of the data is the signi¯cant over{representation of large companies.
We also apply a few sample selection criteria to the original sample. First, we set all
negative values for all variables in the sample as missing. Second, we set observations as
missing if the values of ratio variables are lower than 1st percentile or higher than 99th
percentile. We decided to use the screened data to reduce the potential impact of outliers
upon the parameter estimates. After the screening and including only manufacturing
sector ¯rms we obtain on average 800 ¯rms' quarterly characteristics.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the ¯rms and macroeconomic uncertainty
proxies. All ¯rm{speci¯c variables are from COMPUSTAT and is measured at the ¯scal
year{end. The leverage ratio, B=TA is de¯ned as the ratio of Short-term Debt (item
data45) to Total Assets (item data6). The Cash{to{Asset ratio (C=TA), the Investment{
12To check the robustness of our results to the change of window of variation we also try standard
deviation of close price for the stock during last 6 months and we receive quantitatively similar results.
11to{Asset ratio (I=TA) and the Sales{to{Asset ratio (S=TA) are de¯ned as Cash and
Short{Term Investments (item data1) to total assets ratio, Capital Expenditures (data90
item) to total assets ratio, Sales (item data12) to total assets ratio, respectively.
In our analysis of subsamples of ¯rms, we focus on the applicability of the general
model to a group of ¯rms having similar characteristics instead of formal testing for dif-
ferences between groups of ¯rms, which would necessitate the imposition of constraints
across those groups. Furthermore, our groupings are not mutually exhaustive, but de-
signed to identify ¯rms which are strongly classi¯ed as, e.g., large or high{leveraged
¯rms. Thus, a strategy based on category indicators would not be appropriate, since
many ¯rms will not fall in the group de¯ned by either extreme.
Table 3 breaks down the data across di®erent groups of ¯rms. First, we subdivide
the manufacturing{sector ¯rms (two{digit SIC 20{39) into producers of durable goods
and producers of non{durable goods on the basis of ¯rms' primary SIC codes. A ¯rm
is considered durable if its primary SIC is 24, 25, 32{39.13 SIC classi¯cations for non{
durable industries are 20{23 or 26{31.14 The characteristics of durable and non{durable
goods producers are similar, but the former have higher liquidity ratio.
We categorize ¯rms into high{liquidity and low{liquidity categories, de¯ning ¯rms
as above the 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile of the annual distribution of
liquidity ratio, respectively. Low liquidity ¯rms have higher leverage and sales to total
assets ratios comparing to high liquidity counterparts.
Finally, we de¯ne ¯rms as high{leveraged (large) and low leveraged (small) if their
leverage ratio (total assets) is above 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile,
respectively. Small ¯rms and low leveraged ¯rms keep twice as much of liquid assets
comparing to large ¯rms and high leveraged ¯rms, respectively.
3.2 Empirical results
In this section we present the estimation results on the link between the leverage level
of the ¯rm and macroeconomic uncertainty variables. Based on the predictions of the
13These industries include lumber and wood products, furniture, stone, clay, and glass products,
primary and fabricated metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, transportation
equipment, instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
14These industries include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publishing,
chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastics, and leather products makers.
12dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model, we hypothesize that non-¯nancial ¯rms
decrease their level of debt as uncertainty increases.
The results of estimating Equation (15) are given in Tables 4, 5 and 6 for all manufac-
turing ¯rms and subsamples. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 represent the Arellano{Bond
one{step GMM SYSTEM estimator with the lagged conditional variance of industrial
production, in°ation, S&P index and index of leading indicators, respectively. 15 The
models are estimated using ¯rst di®erences transformation instrumented by all available
moment restrictions starting from (t¡2).The models are estimated using an orthogonal
transformation for cleaning the ¯rm speci¯c e®ect.16 As instruments we use B=TAt¡3
to B=TAt¡5, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡5, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡5, and S=TAt¡2 to
S=TAt¡5 for di®erence equations and ¢S=TAt¡1, ¢CASH=TAt¡1, and ¢I=TAt¡1 for
level equations. The Sargan test results for one{step DPD estimates are not successful.
However, Sargan test has an asymptotic chi{squared distribution only in the case of
homoscedastic error terms. In order to correctly interpret the results coming from the
Sargan test, it is imported to understand the reason why the null hypothesis of correct
speci¯cation of the model may be rejected.17 The validity of instruments is checked using
two{step results, and we cannot then reject the validity of overidentifying restrictions.
Our main ¯nding is that there is a negative and signi¯cant relationship between
leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. The coe±cients for the uncertainty variables
takes values from -0.2007 for industrial production proxy to -1.5489 for index of leading
indicators measure.
The results also suggest signi¯cant positive persistence in the leverage ratio (0.5191
{ 0.5788). The coe±cients for the Cash=TAt and Sale=TAt ratios are negative and
signi¯cant and correspond to our model predictions. The coe±cients are marginally
15We also estimated the model using one{step GMM, two{step GMM and GMM{SYSTEM estima-
tions. None of our results are a®ected by any of these experiments, the results of which are available
upon request.
16To check robustness of our results we also try orthogonal transformations and get similar results.








T ¡ t + 1
¶1=2
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values.
17Arellano and Bond (1991) mention that the Sargan test on the one{step estimation often leads to
rejection of the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
13signi¯cant for I=TAt+1. However, the coe±cient for I=TAt is perversely signed, but
weakly signi¯cant. Finally, overall economic conditions, as captured by the index of
leading indicators, positively a®ects the leverage ratio of US non{¯nancial ¯rms.
We ¯nd an interesting contrast in the results for durable goods makers and non{
durable goods makers reported in the ¯rst two panels of Table 5. Durable goods makers
exhibit negative signi¯cant e®ects for macroeconomic uncertainty proxied by conditional
variance of in°ation and index of leading indicators. The coe±cient for durable good
makers is larger in absolute magnitude than that estimated for all ¯rms. As these com-
panies have larger inventories of work in progress and have a longer production cycle
they are more sensitive to volatility in real economy. At the same time, non{durable
goods producers are more sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty originated from ¯-
nancial markets. Table 5 also shows that there is negative and statistically signi¯cant
relationship between volatility of the index of leading indicators and short term debt
to assets ratio for low liquidity ¯rms. The high liquidity ¯rms leverage is found to be
sensitive to volatility of S&P 500 index while the high liquidity ¯rms change their short
term debt to total assets ratio when volatility of index of leading indicators increases.
In Table 6, we investigate the e®ects of uncertainty on small, large, low leveraged
and high leveraged ¯rms. For the low leveraged ¯rms, the e®ects of macroeconomic
uncertainty from ¯nancial markets are substantial, whereas for the high leveraged ¯rms
macroeconomic uncertainty from ¯nancial markets does not appear to have any signif-
icant e®ect (although the point estimates are uniformly negative). However, there is
negative and signi¯cant e®ect of volatility of index of leading indicators on leverage of
high leveraged ¯rms. This ¯nding may indicate that high{leveraged ¯rms may not be as
°exible to frequent changes in macroeconomy (the S&P index measure has twice higher
volatility as the index of leading indicators proxy) as low{leveraged ¯rms due to costs
of attracting additional external ¯nancing.
The common ¯nding is that uncertainty will reduce the dispersion of cash{to{asset
ratios for both small and large ¯rms, although uncertainty has a much more substantial
e®ect on smaller ¯rms. The coe±cients for macroeconomic uncertainty are negative and
signi¯cant at the 5% or 10% level for index of leading indicators proxy large ¯rms
In summary, we ¯nd strong support for the hypothesis of Equation (15). Firms
decrease their borrowing in more uncertain times. The results di®er for di®erent groups
14of companies having similar characteristics. When the macroeconomic environment
becomes more uncertain, companies become more cautious and borrow less, even when
they might expect to face decreased revenues and potential cash °ow shortages. Note
that these results con¯rm the results regarding the impact of uncertainty on investment
reported in Bloom, Bond and Reenen (2001).
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between leverage of manufacturing ¯rms and
macroeconomic uncertainty using quarterly COMPUSTAT data. We have developed an
empirical model of optimal leverage ratio based on the Euler equation of the standard
neoclassical model of capital accumulation subject to adjustment costs. This model is
extended to the case when the ¯rm increases its leverage ratio, it faces higher costs of
external ¯nancing. Based on the theoretical predictions we anticipate that ¯rms decrease
their use of debt when macroeconomic uncertainty increases. In order to empirically test
our model we employ dynamic panel data methodology. The results suggest negative
and signi¯cant e®ects of macroeconomic uncertainty on leverage for US non{¯nancial
¯rms during 1993{2003.
There are signi¯cant di®erences in the results for di®erent ¯rms' subsamples. Non{
durable goods makers, high{liquidity and low leveraged ¯rms exhibit a larger sensitivity
to macroeconomic uncertainty re°ected by ¯nancial markets, while the durable goods
makers, low{liquidity and high leveraged ¯rms are sensitive to changed in index of
leading indicators. Our results are shown to be robust to inclusion of the index of
leading indicators.
From the policy perspective, we suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty has an e®ect
on non¯nancial ¯rms' capital structure which in turn a®ects their dynamics of invest-
ment. Other studies (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989)) have shown that balance sheet
shocks may a®ect the amplitude of investment cycles in a simple neoclassical model.
Moreover, in many countries monetary policy tends to be persistent in the direction
of change of the monetary instrument, with rare reversals (perhaps re°ecting central
banks' interest rate smoothing objectives). Therefore, ¯rms' sensitivity to macroeco-
nomic uncertainty should be taken into account if more activist monetary policies are
contemplated.
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17Appendix A: Construction of leverage, macroeconomic and ¯rm spe-
ci¯c measures
The following variables are used in the quarterly empirical study.
From the COMPUSTAT database:





From the DRI{McGraw Hill Basic Economics database:
DLEAD: index of leading indicators
From IMF International Financial Statistics:
66IZF: Industrial Production monthly
64XZF: Consumer Price In°ation
From CRSP Stock Market Indices:
S&P 500 Monthly Returns
18Table 1: GARCH proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty
Leading log(IndProdn) CPI Inflation S&P 500
Lagged dep.var. 0.899 0.981 0.989
(0.14)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Constant 0.080 0.001 0.000 0.007
(0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)***
AR(1) 0.909 0.808 0.285 0.907
(0.14)*** (0.07)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)***
AR(2) -0.918
(0.07)***




ARCH(1) 0.063 0.292 0.089 0.019
(0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)***
ARCH(2) -0.204
(0.05)***
GARCH(1) 0.901 0.889 0.872 1.805
(0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)***
GARCH(2) -0.839
(0.04)***
Constant 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Loglikelihood 1937.89 1860.48 2809.59 897.58
Observations 545 535 641 504
Note: OPG standard errors in parentheses. Models are ¯t to detrended log(IndProdn), CPI in°ation,
index of leading indicators and S&P 500 returns. ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All ¯rms ¹ ¾2 p25 p50 p75
B=TAt 0.0504 0.0695 0.0034 0.0242 0.0672
I=TAt 0.0327 0.0325 0.0107 0.0228 0.0434
S=TAt 0.2902 0.1456 0.1959 0.2686 0.3595
C=TAt 0.1077 0.1399 0.0157 0.0483 0.1455
Át 0.0318 0.0324 0.0115 0.0224 0.0400
CV ipt 0.0099 0.0030 0.0078 0.0086 0.0115
CV inflt 0.0022 0.0008 0.0015 0.0017 0.0029
CV sprett 0.0052 0.0019 0.0036 0.0050 0.0063
CV dleadt 0.0049 0.0008 0.0042 0.0047 0.0056
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while ¾2 and ¹ represent its variance
and mean respectively.
20Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by subsample
Durable Non durable
¹ ¾ ¹ ¾
B=TAt 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
I=TAt 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
S=TAt 0.29 0.14 0.29 0.15
C=TAt 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.13
Át 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Low liquidity High liquidity
¹ ¾ ¹ ¾
B=TAt 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06
I=TAt 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
S=TAt 0.31 0.13 0.25 0.17
C=TAt 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.17
Át 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04
Small Large
¹ ¾ ¹ ¾
B=TAt 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07
I=TAt 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
S=TAt 0.31 0.17 0.26 0.12
C=TAt 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.10
Át 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04
Low leverage High leverage
¹ ¾ ¹ ¾
B=TAt 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.09
I=TAt 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
S=TAt 0.28 0.15 0.30 0.15
C=TAt 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.09
Át 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Note: ¾2 and ¹ represent variance and mean, respectively.
21Table 4: Determinants of Leverage: All Firms
Dependent variable: B=TAt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B=TAt¡1 0.5191¤¤¤ 0.5788¤¤¤ 0.5351¤¤¤ 0.5703¤¤¤
[0.037] [0.034] [0.041] [0.034]
S=TAt -0.0502¤¤¤ -0.0441¤¤¤ -0.0714¤¤¤ -0.0339¤¤
[0.016] [0.014] [0.019] [0.013]
C=TAt -0.0792¤¤¤ -0.0971¤¤¤ -0.0727¤¤¤ -0.0854¤¤¤
[0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
I=TAt -0.0671¤¤¤ -0.0704¤¤¤ -0.0763¤¤¤ -0.0723¤¤¤
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015]
I=TAt+1 0.0195 0.0337¤ 0.0199 0.0420¤¤
[0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017]
Leadingt¡1 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0004¤ -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Át -0.0244¤¤ -0.0159 -0.0183 -0.0227¤¤









Sargan 0.14 0.41 0.22 0.36
AR(1) -10.630¤¤¤ -11.820¤¤¤ -9.621¤¤¤ -11.780¤¤¤
AR(2) -1.227 -0.135 -0.998 -0.227
Note: Every equation includes constant and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM SYSTEM using the DPD package
for Ox. Sargan is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p{value reported). LM (k)
is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM-SYSTEM estimations are B=Kt¡3
to B=TAt¡5, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡5, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡5, S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡5 and
¢S=TAt¡1, ¢CASH=TAt¡1, and ¢I=TAt¡1 .* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signif-
icant at 1%.
22Table 5: Determinants of Leverage: Sample splits
Dependent variable: B=TAt
CV ipt¡1 CV inflt¡1 CV sprett¡1 CV leadt¡1
Non{durable
Át -0.0036 -0.0073 0.0101 -0.0120
[0.021] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019]
¿t¡1 -0.2276 -0.5862 -0.9607¤¤ -1.8523¤¤¤
[0.176] [0.787] [0.453] [0.579]
Durable
Át -0.0505¤¤¤ -0.0321¤¤ -0.0423¤¤¤ -0.0408¤¤¤
[0.017] [0.014] [0.016] [0.014]
¿t¡1 -0.1692 -1.4915¤¤ -0.3905 -1.5332¤¤¤
[0.121] [0.642] [0.317] [0.470]
Low liquidity
Át -0.0535¤ -0.0529¤¤ -0.0404¤ -0.0531¤¤
[0.028] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024]
¿t¡1 -0.1457 -0.9414 -0.3524 -1.7932¤¤¤
[0.161] [0.876] [0.385] [0.674]
High liquidity
Át -0.0159 -0.0155 -0.0119 -0.0190
[0.014] [0.012] [0.016] [0.012]
¿t¡1 -0.0048 -0.4801 -0.9622¤¤ -0.8832
[0.166] [0.744] [0.488] [0.651]
Note: Every equation includes constant, B=TAt¡1, S=TAt, I=TAt, I=TAt+1, Leadingt¡1 and industry
dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM
SYSTEM using the DPD package for Ox. Sargan is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
(p{value reported). LM (k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM-SYSTEM
estimations are B=Kt¡3, CASH=TAt¡2, CASH=TAt¡3, I=TAt¡2, I=TAt¡3, S=TAt¡2, S=TAt¡3 and
¢S=TAt¡1, ¢CASH=TAt¡1, and ¢I=TAt¡1 .* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant
at 1%.
23Table 6: Determinants of Leverage: Sample splits
Dependent variable: B=TAt
CV ipt¡1 CV inflt¡1 CV sprett¡1 CV leadt¡1
Low leverage
Át -0.0045 -0.0047 -0.0014 -0.0049
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
¿t¡1 -0.0543 0.2906 -0.4936¤¤¤ 0.0491
[0.072] [0.312] [0.158] [0.224]
High leverage
Át -0.0796¤¤ -0.0935 -0.0720¤¤ -0.1005¤¤¤
[0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036]
¿t¡1 -0.0845 -2.2579 -0.1716 -3.5600¤¤¤
[0.341] [1.919] [0.981] [1.285]
Small
Át -0.1365¤¤ -0.1263¤¤ -0.0987¤ -0.1441¤¤
[0.061] [0.057] [0.059] [0.059]
¿t¡1 0.0072 -0.4102 -0.5109 -1.8950¤
[0.251] [1.385] [0.672] [1.002]
Large
Át 0.0043 0.0216 -0.0013 0.0156
[0.018] [0.016] [0.020] [0.016]
¿t¡1 -0.2793 -1.0223 -0.3129 -1.4347¤¤
[0.179] [0.759] [0.492] [0.569]
Note: Every equation includes constant, B=TAt¡1, S=TAt, I=TAt, I=TAt+1, Leadingt¡1 and industry
dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM
SYSTEM using the DPD package for Ox. Sargan is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
(p{value reported). LM (k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM-SYSTEM
estimations are B=Kt¡3, CASH=TAt¡2, CASH=TAt¡3, I=TAt¡2, I=TAt¡3, S=TAt¡2, S=TAt¡3 and
¢S=TAt¡1, ¢CASH=TAt¡1, and ¢I=TAt¡1 .* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant
at 1%.
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